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The Sanctity of Life Seduced
A Symposium on Medical Ethics
added impetus, but they have not created it. This
drive existed well before they came along, with a
strong shift in public opinion visible by the late 1970s,
at which point a majority of people reported having
a favorable attitude toward euthanasia. I am endlessly
struck by the number of ordinary people, not caught
up in the public debate, who fear a technological
death and are as a consequence attracted to euthanasia or assisted suicide. The well-publicized court
cases, I am convinced, have steadily inspired the worries about a bad death now being capitalized upon by
the promoters of euthanasia.

Daniel Callahan

T

wo important social forces lie behind the potentially disastrous turn of public opinion toward
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide in recent
years. The necessary condition is the excessive emphasis in our culture on choice and self-determination. The sufficient condition, the triggering cause,
has been the highly visible string of court cases from
Quinlan in 1976 to Cruzan in 1990.
Those cases shared one important, eye-catching
feature: someone in the throes of a critical illness was
not being allowed to die, and it was necessary to turn
to the courts to make death from natural causes possible. The American public took from these cases a
threatening message: if you enter an American hospital or nursing home permanently unconscious,
you are in danger of having your life extended
beyond any point most people would care to endure.
Moreover, the public has now been tutored to understand that medicine has become devilishly clever in
its ability to keep your body going long after there is
much, or any, likelihood that you retain any characteristically human capacities or potentialities.
The only way there will be any chance at all of
keeping the evil of euthanasia at bay will be to recognize the moral and medical distortions that our obeisance to medical technology have insinuated into
how we commonly think about death and dying.
Unless people can be convinced that the medical behemoth will not extend their life beyond some reasonable point, they will not be much swayed by slippery-slope arguments. For them the clear and present danger is a technologically induced bad death for
themselves or their family members, not the more
remote hazard of involuntary euthanasia.
A particularly frightful feature of the current drive
for euthanasia is the extent to which it is a genuine
grass roots movement. The Kevorkians and Humphrys and Quills have given the movement some

H

ow has medical technology—and, more important, its implicit ideology—led us astray? Its seduction has taken three forms. The first is that it has
led us increasingly to think of death itself as accidental, a contingent event, no longer the result of natural
forces but of some human decision. Nature is being
increasingly banished as a cause of death. For the
medical researcher, no known cause of death is acceptable, and the research enterprise carries on an
endless war against all of them. As Leon R. Kass reminded us some years ago, the logic of this kind of
warfare is nothing less than a search for immortality.
For the doctor at the bedside, matters are not too
much different: with a litde more skill, a litde more
luck, a research breakthrough here or there, this
dying patient before me might be saved. Although
they know the feeling is often irrational, many doctors have accepted the imperious myth of modern
medicine that somehow or other death has become
their fault—even when they turn off a machine in the
face of an inevitable, imminent, and unavoidable patient's demise. They think nature has been banished,
that only their power over life and death now counts.
The second seduction of medical technology follows hard on the heels of the first. It is the incentive
this technology provides for the erasure of the distinction between omission and commission, between
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killing and allowing to die. Many philosophers and
others, in their search for arguments to legitimate
euthanasia, have contended that since people become
dead in either case, there is no serious moral distinction to be made between turning off a respirator or
pulling a feeding tube on the one hand, and giving
someone a lethal injection on the other. Ironically
and unhappily, many conservative thinkers—out of
an apparent fear of abuse of the notion of "allowing
to die"—have themselves come to act as if they also
see no real moral difference between omission and
commission either (even if they may still agree with
the distinction in principle). It is this "as if" attitude
that has inspired most of the court cases; e.g., if
Nancy Cruzan is not kept alive with feeding tubes,
this is tantamount to killing her, not just allowing
nature to take its course
The technological seduction behind all this is that
medicine has now become omnipotent, holding life
and death wholly in its hands. And we human beings,
who wield this technology, have now become omniresponsible. Whether we omit treatment or kill
people directly is irrelevant. What matters is that,
whatever we do, death has now become our responsibility and can no longer be blamed on nature.
The third seduction is the way the ideology of medical progress and technology has managed to capture
the principle of the sanctity of life and turn that principle to its own advantage. As one of the great contemporary apostles of medical progress, the lay lobbyist Mary Lasker, once revealingly put it, "I'm
really opposed to heart attacks and cancer and
strokes the way I'm opposed to sin." Death by disease
has, in an age that cannot accept human finitude or
mortality, become the equivalent to death by malicious human intent. Correspondingly, many of those
who would uphold the sanctity of life seem now to
believe that they must follow technology wherever it
goes so long as it preserves life. Medical technology,
the child of the Enlightenment, has coopted the ancient principle of the sanctity of life and turned it
into its handmaiden.

I

s there any way to overcome this captivity to tech. nology, to allow death to return to its natural
place, the destiny of us all? I want to urge two principles that could help us toward that end. The first
principle is that no one should have to die a worse
death as a result of medical technology than would
have been the case prior to the invention of that technology. If technology threatens to leave us worse off,
and we nonetheless feel obliged to use it, we have then
indeed become its slaves. The second principle is that
doctors should feel as great an anxiety that a patient
will die a poor death from technological excess as the
present anxiety that the patient will die because there
is too little technology; and these dual anxieties
should remain in tension with each other, neither
the one nor the other being allowed to gain the upper
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hand. The moral bias now is so powerfully in the direction of using technology to preserve life that patients are put at risk of a poor death as a result. That
bias needs changing.
If used properly, the traditional moral distinction
between ordinary and extraordinary treatment can
be most helpful in avoiding the technological seductions I have mentioned. I take that distinction to
mean, in its traditional sense, that no one is obliged
to undergo treatment that imposes too heavy a
burden if there is no significant and corresponding
benefit. A more conservative, nontraditional, sense
has, however, recently become popular in some circles. It is that benefit to the patient consists of any
non-burdensome treatment that will sustain life,
whatever the condition of that life, even the zombielike life of the victim in a permanent vegetative state
(PVS). Moreover, if a non-burdensome antibiotic will
sustain the life of someone with advanced cancer,
there is, in this view, an obligation to provide it—
even if the final death will be worse than that temporarily averted by the use of the antibiotic, and even
if much worse than it would have been prior to the
discovery of antibiotics.
For my part, I can imagine no conceivable moral or
spiritual benefit in being kept alive technologically in
a PVS state. It is a condition actually far worse than
that of a newly fertilized egg; the latter has a potentiality for developing characteristically human traits,
while the former has forever lost that possibility.
3r those who nonetheless believe there is value in
preserving the life of someone in PVS, I suggest
two questions they might put to themselves. Before
respirators and artificial feeding existed, would they
have wanted medical research to invent those devices
for the sole purpose of keeping PVS patients alive? If
one believes it a good to be kept alive in a PVS state,
does this not imply that further research should be
carried out to make such a thing even more possible—to keep those in that state alive longer and
longer, even a full lifetime?
What about the cessation of artificial nutrition
and hydration for the PVS victim? Is that moral?
About a decade ago, when I first began thinking
about this issue, I was far more reluctant to support
such cessation than I am now. Two factual discoveries changed my mind. The first was that artificial nutrition and hydration were first developed only as a
temporary means of helping a person overcome a
temporary inability to eat or swallow water, e.g., as
part of the recovery process in the aftermath of an
operation. It was only in the 1970s, after some major
improvements in the tubing and techniques of nutrition and hydration, that the procedure became more
widespread, eventually being used routinely with
PVS victims. My second discovery was that the inability to eat, and a failing desire to eat, is itself one of
the classical symptoms of a dying body. An inability
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to eat was not, in the past, taken as evidence that a patient was "starving" to death, but only manifesting a
symptom of a dying body. The word "starving" was
only recently introduced as part of the polemics
about artificial nutrition and hydration.
These two discoveries led me to conclude that extended artificial nutrition and hydration for the PVS
patient should be considered "extraordinary" treatment, neither "ordinary" medical treatment nor, for
that matter, ordinary nonmedical caring. It was only
because, once again, technology had coopted the sanctity of life principle that many came to see the cessation of artificial feeding as itself a killing. Once again,
what had been a legitimate omission prior to the new
technology was now turned into an act of commission.
The perfecdy natural process whereby a dying body
can no longer take food or water has been transmuted
into something that has become our fault if we don't
use the new technology to remedy the situation.

I

n sum, in the argument that a PVS patient ought to
. be sustained as long as possible I see the unhappy
fruits of the three technological seductions I described above: death by "starvation" has now become
our fault, not nature's, if we omit treatment; the distinction between omission and commission is erased
in the insistence that the stopping of artificial feeding is the same as killing the patient and, as too often

happens, a new technology gets legitimated and routinized by an invocation of the sanctity of life. And
just to make matters worse, the still useful and traditional distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment has been corrupted, making it
appear as if it is mere ordinary treatment to preserve
the body of a PVS patient indefinitely.
Perhaps there are those who believe that it is a
great medical step forward that we can indefinitely
sustain the lives of those who have lost their human
potential, or who believe that the sanctity of life is enhanced by large numbers of permanently unresponsive bodies being sustained through a network of
feeding tubes at one end of those bodies and excretory
tubes at the other. I think, on the contrary, that technology got the better of them once more. Medical science is very clever in making us feel guilty about accepting the end of human life; in its hubris it has led
us to think of death as a curable condition, or at least
indefinitely postponable. H u m a n life had value
before technology came along, and if death is an
insult to the human condition, that insult requires a
spiritual, not scientific, remedy.
is President of the Hastings
Center and author of the recently published book The
Troubled Dream of Life: Living with Mortality
(Simon ir Schuster).
DANIEL CALLAHAN

Responses to Daniel Callahan
Gilbert Meilaender
(An imaginary dialogue)
GM: I have to say right at the outset, Dan, that The
Troubled Dream of Life is a superb book. I've read
much of what you've written over the years, and this
is the very best—thoughtful, provocative, and even
(as one reviewer put it) pious. Anyone who finds your
article in this symposium worth reading will certainly want to turn to the book itself.
DC: I'm pleased to hear you say that, Gil, especially
since we don't agree on every aspect of these questions. Pleased as I am, though, I suspect you're not
going to let praise have the last word.
GM: Oh, but I will. Of course, words of praise at
beginning and end may still bracket a few dissatisfactions that need probing. I'm not always
certain that some of your points are made as precisely as they should be. And in some respects I think
you're almost too concerned with stopping the growing euthanasia movement.
DC: Too concerned? Surely you don't mean that.

GM: Yes I do. In order to draw a line that you think
will work for public policy, a line that may keep euthanasia from becoming legally sanctioned, you have
to ignore the fact that we may already be there. We
may already be deliberately letting die people who
aren't really dying—and doing so simply because we
think their lives aren't worth preserving.
DC: That's a serious issue, and, as you know, I've addressed it. But don't you think it's important that we
try to undermine the growing sentiment in support
of euthanasia?
GM: Of course.
DC: Then a line that makes sense to people—such as
the line between omission and commission—may be
exactly what our public policy needs, even if it
doesn't capture every distinction as precisely as we
might like.
GM: Perhaps that would make good sense if one
thought the line you draw will hold forever, but I
don't think it will. I suspect a day will come when we
say, "Why not kill by commission? After all, we've
been doing it by omission for a long time."
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DC: I'm not sure I follow you.
GM: Look, Dan, you know that I don't entirely disagree with you. Certainly if someone dies because I
shoot him, I have caused that death in a way I haven't
if I simply do not give him medical care that he needs
to live.
DC: Agreed. That, indeed, is part of my point.
GM: But will you agree that there might also be occasions when I could be culpable even if I did not cause
his death? Culpable because I failed to do for him
what I could and should have done?
DC: Yes, of course, though I doubt that we'd agree on
which cases fit that description.
GM: Probably not, but let's take what we can get for
the moment. And let's suppose that in our society
today there are in fact cases—more by my reckoning,
fewer by yours—in which we are culpable for deaths
we haven't caused. Culpable because we gladly seized
an opportunity not to treat when in fact we should
have treated. In such cases, then, our aim and intent
is to bring about death—even if by omission rather
than commission. And, therefore, I suspect a day will
come when we look back upon this time as a transitional stage on the way to approved euthanasia. In
that day we will say, "We were already doing the
moral equivalent of euthanasia; we just weren't yet
prepared to call it by its right name."
DC: I get the point all right. But I think it's a
bad strategy to adopt; it just plays into the hands
of those who build on current practices to win approval of euthanasia. And I still don't think you appreciate sufficiently the important difference that remains between omission and commission. We die because it is our nature to die. And the natural world is
a "given" and a "limit" up against which we live. We
cannot entirely reshape it, as if we could create our
own world. And we shouldn't suppose that whenever
someone dies we are responsible for not keeping him
alive longer. Everyone must die sometime. We are not
culpable because that day has come; yet modern medicine tends to make us feel as if we are. It makes us
feel as if we must always choose life.

FIRST T H I N G S

limit to our plans and projects. Such faith allows us
to acknowledge death when its time has come without choosing it or aiming at it.
DC: Are you sure that distinction you make has any
cash value? From where I sit it looks as if you religious folk just end up always wanting to treat, and
you never acknowledge death soon enough for that
death to be a relatively peaceful and tolerable one.
That's where you end up when you are never willing
to acknowledge that life can become a burden we no
longer wish to sustain.
GM: Let's consider one of your own examples. You
object to a view (my own, as you know) that we can
reject the burdens of treatment but should not reject
the burden of life itself. Suppose, you say, "a non-burdensome antibiotic will sustain the life of someone
with advanced cancer." Are we obligated to provide
it? Or might we not just say that, in order to avoid a
worse final death, we can act as if antibiotics had
never been discovered and were not available. Is that
a fair summary of your illustrative case?
DC: I think so.
GM: Here's a place where more precision seems
needed. I'm confident you don't want to say that an
otherwise healthy twenty-year-old with a severe case
of bacterial pneumonia may properly decline antibiotics—thinking thereby to avoid a worse death fifty
years down the road.
DC: Of course I don't.
GM: And I, in turn, don't want to say that the person
with "advanced cancer"—that is, one who is already
well into his dying—must necessarily accept an antibiotic. But it's important to be clear why I would
say that. Is his life experienced as burdensome?
Almost surely. Can we understand that he might
want to die? Certainly. Is it morally permissible,
therefore, for him to choose to die—to decline the antibiotic so that he will die? I don't think so.
DC: So he has to take it and suffer a worse death than
he might otherwise have?

DC: But that's exactly my point. Religious believers,
affirming (as they suppose) the sanctity of life, end
up as slaves to our technology. They think they are
morally obligated to follow wherever it leads.

GM: No. I already said he didn't have to take it. He
doesn't have to take it because—by the very terms
of the case—he is already dying. For him this antibiotic has become just as useless as many treatments for
his cancer, since—as Paul Ramsey once put it—the
one dying is a person and not simply an ensemble of
diseases.

GM: No, I think you've got it wrong there, Dan.
There is a kind of surface similarity between two
quite different ways of seeing death as an enemy.
Medical science sees it as an enemy; so does religious
faith. But religious faith does not affirm life as the ultimate good to be pursued, since it accepts God as the

DC: Well, that is not the way I would put the matter,
but suppose we put it your way for the moment.
We're still in agreement on the two cases. The
twenty-year-old with pneumonia would be wrong to
decline the antibiotic. The man or woman dying of
advanced cancer would not.

GM: And so we ought. Jews and Christians, at any
rate, have said that we should always "choose life."
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GM: Shall we add one more version of the case and
see whether we continue to agree? Suppose now that
our patient is a seventy-seven-year-old man, relatively
robust physiologically for his age, but suffering increasing dementia. Suppose now that he is the one
with pneumonia.
DC: I suppose you'd say we ought to give him the antibiotic.
GM: Yes, I would.
DC: Even though we may be keeping him alive to
suffer a worse death down the road?
GM: Who can say whether that will be the case? You
are the one who has written—very eloquently—about
the moral failure involved in our attempts to control
and shape the whole of life. In this case the antibiotic
would clearly be useful in preserving his life, and the
treatment itself would not be a burden to him.
DC: Yes, but his life may be a burden.
GM: Of course. And I already granted that we might
even wish or pray that he would die. That's quite
understandable, and I don't think there's anything
wrong with it. But if the burden I seek to rid him of
is not the treatment but the life, then I fear I am doing
more than wishing he could die. If I don't treat him
for that reason, there would be no way to describe my
"plan of action" other than by saying: "I won't treat
him so that he will die." And that I wouldn't want to
say. If the burden to be gotten rid of is his life, then
that life is what I'm taking aim at.
DC: Well, I doubt that we can reach agreement on
this case. But perhaps I can press you just a bit. Are
you going to put a feeding tube in such a patient if he
can't or doesn't eat? You have, after all, written in defense of artificial nutrition and hydration.
GM: True. But here again we need to make some
distinctions. Suppose we try to feed him by tube
and he constandy pulls at it, seeming to find it burdensome. I wouldn't restrain him in order to feed
him. I'd accept the fact that this treatment was burdensome for him. What I've noted in earlier writings,
however, is that such an argument cannot work in the
case of patients in a persistent vegetative state, since,
as far as we know, they do not find a feeding tube burdensome.
DC: All the worse! So we have to sustain the life of
people in what I can only call a "zombie-like" state?
GM: Shall we ask ourselves for a moment what the
best way to describe these people is? One of the really
beautiful parts of your book—a part that doesn't
make it into what you say in your short essay here—is
the section (in chapter 4) on "Mourning the Loss of
the Optimal Self." You suggest that there is no ideal
point in life at which we are most truly ourselves.

And while granting that we cannot bear to think of
ourselves as having lost our intellectual capacities,
you even say: "[I]t may be no less a mistake to think
that we must have an optimal mind than that we
must have an optimal body." Our lives do not lack
dignity when our mental capacities fail. I take it that
you and I agree about that.
DC: Yes, I think we do. But surely treatment—including feeding by tube—for the PVS patient is a perfect
example of futile treatment. And you yourself
allow that we have no obligation to provide useless
treatment. An inability to eat is a perfectly natural
part of the process of dying. That a person in a
persistent vegetative state cannot take in nourishment is not our fault; it is simply "a symptom of a
dying body."
GM: If I were persuaded of that, Dan, I think we
could agree about proper care for PVS patients.
Indeed, when I first wrote about this question I noted
that "at least in some cases . . . lapsing into permanent coma might be a sign that a person is trying to
die." If it is—whenever it is—I would have no moral
objection to withholding or withdrawing a feeding
tube. But, as you know, the true PVS patient is physiologically robust; he may live for years if given nourishment. It's rather hard to see such a person's failure
to eat as a symptom of a dying body. I suspect, in fact,
that the real symptom is our failure to feed—a symptom of our profound dis-ease before one who is clearly one of us yet so unlike us.
DC: Well, if you don't like my description of these patients as dying, what alternative would you offer?
GM: I would describe a Karen Ann Quinlan or a
Nancy Cruzan not as a dying person but as a severely
disabled person. Similarly, a quadriplegic is severely
disabled and unable to feed himself, but he is not a
dying person. The fact that he is unable to give himself nourishment is not a symptom of a dying body; it
is the result of a severe injury and disability.
DC: And in an earlier age you would have tried to develop a feeding tube for the sole purpose of keeping
alive a person in a persistent vegetative state?
GM: I would have tried to do anything I thought
might benefit the life the person has. That doesn't
necessarily mean developing a feeding tube. It might
mean spending hours trying to provide some nourishment by mouth. That such an attempt would fail
is no doubt true, but, as you well know, we don't have
an obligation to succeed.
DC: Let's talk more another time.
GM: Agreed. And, Dan, it really is an excellent book.
GILBERT MEILAENDER teaches in the Department of
Religion at Oberlin College.
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William B. Smith

D

aniel Callahan is surely correct that stern proponents and opponents of euthanasia can share the
same obsession—control. Some medical types resent
death because it seems outside their technical "control"; some pro-choice types resent any suffering or
discomfort, again outside their "control/'
Life control, birth control, death control—there is
a controlling logic here, a gnostic "worldly" wisdom
that does not like the world we h^ve been given and
by supreme effort seeks to construct a world that can
be controlled.
No convinced Christian is obliged to prolong life
"indefinitely/' nor should he even try. Medicalizing
technology to prolong life indefinitely is as futile as it
is obscene. But I would differ with Callahan on what
motivates the obsessed controllers; I doubt that it is
fear of non-beneficial benefits as much as it is loss of
belief in the afterlife.
Guessing at motives aside, what I fear is the loose
use of language, especially by bean counters who will
find some system (rationing, rating, capitation) to declare non-beneficial benefits not cost-effective and
thus no longer available.
When functional definitions are wedded to financial decisions, some folks are going to be defined off
the human list. I take it as a guiding principle that all
social engineering is preceded by verbal engineering. Thus, I am reluctant to accept neologisms and
am uneasy with such terms as "merely physiological
existence," or "biologically tenacious individuals,"
or, as Daniel Callahan would have it, "the zombielike life of the PVS victim."
In time, words shape (engineer) the deeds we do
and sanction. Not long ago, there were special provisions in place ensuring that, in most instances, assisted nutrition and hydration was outside the category
of "extraordinary" care for PVS patients. Legally,
this is no longer the case. Legally, the list of patients
deserving human care is shorter today. On the caring
list, PVS is now an unlisted number—not only in the
dying context where nothing more reasonable can be
done, but now in the chronic cases who are simply
not dying fast enough.

W

hat has changed so fast in so few years? I suspect not the discovery of some medical history
about what motives helped introduce some new technology, nor the announcement that it is symptomatic
of the dying body not to want food. The latter simply
begs the question by smuggling the word "dying"
into the description, thus verbally converting a
chronic case into a dying one.
What has changed, I think, is a bit of verbal engineering. Where Callahan focuses on "potential for
development," others speak of capacity for "cognitive-affective" behavior. If or when that potential or

capacity is lost for the PVS patient, then the human
status deserving of medical-nursing care is lost as
well. When we draw that kind of quality-of-life functional line, some folks are going to qualify and some
won't.
The PVS designation is treated as a label whose
time has come. It is presented as an air-tight scientific diagnosis as stringent in its discovery as it is unarguable in its outcomes. Indeed, some professional
groups (or spokesmen for same) have so declared.
Long ago, T. S. Eliot warned us: "words spread." I
may be slower than others, but I do not find in the literature absolute statements of the clinical factors
unanimously agreed to by medical professionals
defining PVS. Such unanimity would be important
when the PVS label automatically removes someone
from the human care list.
I accept the conventional ordinary/extraordinary
distinction of received Christian teaching: ordinary
= obligatory; extraordinary = optional. I further
accept the definition of euthanasia put forward by
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF)
in its Declaration On Euthanasia (1980): "Any act or
omission which of itself or by intention causes
death." I also accept the CDF view that "when inevitable death is imminent in spite of the means used,
it is permitted . . . to refuse forms of treatment that
would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to
the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted."
"Imminent" in the above view is to be understood
as hours or days, not six months or a year. Also, while
the failed "treatment" aspect of the above quote is
often cited, the qualification—"so long as the normal
care... not [be] interrupted"—is often omitted.
The CDF Declaration addresses but does not precisely answer all cases of PVS. An excellent resource
paper of the U.S. Bishops Pro-Life Committee issued
in 1992 further specifies the assisted nutrition and
hydration question ("Nutrition and Hydration:
Moral and Pastoral Reflections"). Wisely, in my view,
the U.S. Bishops did not try to resolve every PVS situation case antecedently, but they did propose a nuanced statement of correct principles and presumptions that are helpful in the resolution of each PVS
situation—case by case. This case-specific approach
seems wiser to me than a one-size-fits-all label that is
scientifically unavailable and morally dubious.
n the non-dying context, the presumption is for
assisted N&H unless specific pathological factors
urge otherwise. Often, unfortunately, the clinical factors do not turn the moral fulcrum but rather legal
and procedural elements do: family wishes, signed
directives. We live in a society that seems more concerned with signing the right forms than with doing
the right thing. Procedural ethics continue to swamp
and consume substantive ethics at every turn and in
every context. The fact-specific calculus may not sit

I
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well with the legal mind, but common or general
laws seem uncommonly clumsy instruments for such
fine-line detail.
There are exceptions to the pro-N&H presumption. Surely, for a patient who can no longer assimilate food, N&H provides no benefit; similarly, some
stomach cancer cases result in feeding the tumor instead of the patient; and there are those who are so
fragile that almost any invasive insert causes more
problems than it relieves.
In these cases, I assume death is truly imminent.
But in the chronic case, where the patient is not
in imminent danger of death, the omission of assisted
N&H is a lethal omission, for by that omission we
set in motion a chain of events known to be deathdealing.
Of what benefit is this assistance? The support—
caring even where there is no curing—affirms
human solidarity in both directions: care-giver and
care-receiver. It is a human virtue to care for those
who cannot care for themselves, and in that act of
caring we affirm that it is a human person we care
for—not some mere physiological process. After all,
we water live plants with regularity. Do our own
kind deserve less?
But once the "potential for development" sock is
fitted to all PVS patients, how does one control the
logic of that functional standard? There are some
persons so badly compromised at birth that they do
not or never will have such potential. I don't suggest
that doctors and nurses will not feed them, but I'm
not sure the bean counters will.
Some judge, in some jurisdiction, will soon discover that someone's "right to privacy" is broad enough
to include the "right" not to care, or that suicide or assisted suicide are implicit in the "concept of ordered
liberty." Several courts have already sanctioned dehydration as the "treatment of choice"—if it is so
chosen by the patient, or by the patient's proxy.
In my view, the PVS situation should be considered
case by case with agonizing attention to case-specific
detail. A one-size-fits-all label seems to simplify a difficult matter, but it simplifies too much by simply removing a whole category of persons from the human
care list.
About that removal, bean counters may have no
scruples; but ethicists should.
MSGR. WILLIAM B. SMITH is Prof essor of Moral Theology at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, in Yonkers,
New York.

M. Thérèse Lysaught

H

ow can a theologian resist commending Daniel
Callahan for his closing line: "[I]f death is an
insult to the human condition, that insult requires a
spiritual, not scientific, remedy"? This insight in

itself makes Callahan's an important article. Overall, I agree with him, I disagree with him, and I want
him to push the logic of his argument to a more complete conclusion.
Where do we agree? He is correct that it is crucial
to maintain the moral distinction between acts of
omission and commission. Further, his analysis of
the relationship between medicine, technology, and
the fact of death is compelling, although ultimately
he gives too much agency to technology: it is primarily the ideology behind technology, and not the technology itself, that does the damage. And finally, I appreciate his challenge to recover the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary treatment; this
would certainly be a helpful, practical first step in beginning the process of reassessing and reordering
our relationship with technologies at the end of life.
Where do we disagree? This retrieval of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction is more a "scientific"
solution than a "spiritual" one, and I am concerned
that this technique alone will, in the end, primarily
treat a symptom rather than cure the disease. For as
Callahan rightly notes, our captivity to technology
results from its implicit ideology—our confusion
over the meaning of death. But while his solution—
recovering a notion of death as natural—could alleviate the agony of particular dying individuals and
their caregivers, I am not convinced this will effectively ameliorate those conditions that impel public
opinion toward the "potentially disastrous" outcomes
of euthanasia and assisted suicide.
Why? The problem lies with the notion of the "natural." Natural can be construed in two diametrically
opposed ways. On the one hand, we live in a culture
that is thoroughly Baconian, evidenced best in capitalist expansion and medical pioneering. In this
view, nature, especially construed as raw, unfettered,
unpredictable power, is there to be mastered, overcome, shaped, and directed to meet human needs and
ends. To be human is to control nature, to decide how
it will serve human ends. Within this framework,
therefore, to define death as merely natural may well
fuel the impetus to denaturalize it, to work to overcome it. This is one source of the tyranny of technology and may well only further it.
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ι the other hand, understanding death as a nat
ural event may further fuel the impetus toward
euthanasia and assisted suicide: if death is merely nat
ural—the end of a reasonable span of a full and
meaningful life with nothing to be feared—it may
well be fully rational, completely reasonable, to end it
when the capacities of (natural) life no longer meet
the needs, goals, and wishes of the individual. Cer
tainly Jack Kevorkian and his patients accept death
as natural.
Thus, Callahan is correct that implicit in the tyran
ny of technology is the ideology of our understanding
of death. But here his logic compels him to go further:
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implicit in our understanding of death is the ideology
of the autonomous individual, in short, our anthropology. Clearly, Callahan recognizes that anthropology is central to the problem; he notes that our culture places "excessive emphasis on choice and self-determination," and that this compels us to want to find
a human decision behind every death. But he does not
pursue this further. It is this anthropology that must
be addressed; this is the spiritual issue at stake.
That the issue at stake is a spiritual one is evident
in the religious imagery that pervades Callahan's account of technological medicine: that the war on
death is a search for "immortality"; that the dying patient might be "saved"; that medicine is seen as "omnipotent, holding life and death wholly in its hands";
that a lobbyist equates heart attacks, cancer, and
strokes with sin (interesting rhetoric in the public
sphere, but I'll save that discussion for another day).
In most cultures, questions of immortality, salvation, sin, and the meaning of death have been answered and continue to be answered within religious
traditions. Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and
so on recognize a power in life—identified with a
sense of the sanctity of life—and a power in death, insofar as death seems to overcome, eliminate, evacuate
the power of life. But generally, life is not considered
essentially sacred, that is, in and of itself. Rather, it is
considered sacred because it is a gift from the source
that holds the power of life. It is a gift held in trust; a
gift to be returned to the giver throughout the course
of life in the form of worship, procreation, a good
life, and finally in death. In short, life derives both its
limits as well as its meaning from a wider context ordered to interrelated ends—nature, community, and/
or relationship with the transcendent. Likewise,
human bearers of that life draw their identity, selfunderstanding, and the meaning and limits of their
agency from a context ordered to ends beyond their
individual choosing or effecting.
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ie have, however, lost our sense of being part of
anything larger than our single selves. The Baconian turn demythologized nature and the Enlightenment elevated the autonomous human individual
to the status of the transcendent. No longer does
human life—and correlatively human dying and
death—draw its meaning from the context within
which it is situated, be that the rhythms of nature or
the story of God-in-history. Human life is now essentially sacred rather than sacred by participation.
Consequently, "salvation" becomes equivalent either
with the prolongation of biological human life at all
costs or with individual control over the way a particular life ends. Medicine and medical technology have
become our soteriology.
Thus, the problem is not so much that technology
has seduced the sanctity of life. Rather, individualism and autonomy have seduced the meaning of
human life, and therefore, the meaning of human
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death. H u m a n persons have become idols, worshipped as ends in themselves, cut off from any sort
of context that might provide them with meaning.
We don't know who we are, we don't know how to
live (well), we don't know how to talk together about
these questions, and we don't know how to die. This
is precisely a spiritual crisis.
Callahan has taken an important step toward overcoming the tragedies of lives unnecessarily prolonged by out-of-control medical technology. He has
helpfully challenged the idolatry of technology, but
the problem of idolatrizing human life remains. The
problems of euthanasia and assisted suicide point us
to deeper spiritual questions: questions of human
identity, agency, control, finitude, and humility
before the aspects of reality that truly transcend
human existence. These are first questions of how to
live well before they are questions of when to die and
how to die peacefully.
M. THÉRÈSE LYSAUGHT is an Associate at the Park
Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith, and
Ethics in Chicago.

Caroline Whitbeck
iniel Callahan makes a constructive contribution to the discussion of medical interventions at
the end of life by emphasizing that the dying person
often ceases to want or take food, not because of depression or out of an attempt to starve to death, but
because his or her body can no longer metabolize
food. He is to be commended for abandoning his earlier position that the dying should be fed, even
against their wishes.
The middle class in the United States is unused to
seeing death, or birth either. (The white middle class
may be especially culturally deprived.) Ignorance of
many matters of birth and death often leads people—
medical ethicists, patients and their families, and
even health care providers—to make misinformed or
inadvertently cruel decisions. It is nurses and nurses'
aids who now attend women in labor, care for newborns, and provide most of the care of those who are
seriously ill or dying. For most of humanity these aspects of what we regard as nursing care are provided
by family or neighbors.
It has become common for us to have serious decision-making responsibilities when we are facing one
of our first experiences attending a dying person.
Most of us are doubly unprepared: we do not understand the constandy changing array of medical options, and our culture's obsession with self-determination has permitted us to turn away from uncomfortable realities of the human condition because they
are relegated to our "private lives." As a result most of
us are seriously unprepared for some of our most important responsibilities for those closest to us.
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edical ethics might have made a concerted effort
to overcome the dangerous ignorance of the
American middle class, but it has not. The dominant
voices have not been those of nurses and other
providers of care informing us about medical interventions, nor the voices of patients and families who
have faced these experiences, nor those of the lay and
ordained pastoral caregivers who have supported
and advised members of their faith communities as
they tried to understand and respond well to these
complex and frightening situations.
The dominant voices in medical ethics in the last
twenty years have largely sought to fit wrenching
human problems to abstract models, especially the
model of "dilemmas," that is, "forced choices between
two equally unacceptable options." Such abstract
representations have distorted those problems and
often undermined public understanding of them. A
common approach to resolving the artificial abstract
problems is to propose general "principles" from
which one might simply deduce a response.
In the last decade major figures from Alasdair
Maclntyre to Annette Baier, Stephen Toulmin, and
Albert Jonsen have offered a variety of powerful arguments against abstract approaches to ethics and, in
particular, against the attempt to address moral
problems by formulating "principles." Objecting to
the formulation of such abstract principles does not
require that one altogether dispense with principles
in moral argument. I agree with Maclntyre that although there are no timeless, ahistorical principles
or moral rules, there are enduring principles, principles linked to a domain of application and that have
stood the test of time, "surviving a wide range of challenges and objections, perhaps undergoing limited
reformations or changes in how [they are] understood, but retaining [their] basic identity through the
history of [their] applications."
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oral change does not necessarily require formulation of new principles, however. For example, some hospitals, such as the teaching hospital
in which I help teach the students from the HarvardMIT Program in Health Sciences and Technology,
have made significant changes in their policies in the
last few years. Thus it is no longer their policy to attempt resuscitation on any patient who undergoes
cardiac arrest unless there is a "Do Not Resuscitate"
(DNR) order. Such changes are certainly due in part
to the recognition that the attempt to resuscitate
often breaks the bones of an older patient's breast
plate, a condition from which the patient never recovers and which causes the patient great pain.
(Hospital policies have also been influenced by
recognition that the concentrations of the HIV virus
rise significantly in dying AIDS patients, and most
health care workers who have contracted AIDS from
their patients have done so performing interventions
like cardiopulmonary resuscitation with dying pa-

tients. Therefore, reforms such as changes in policies
about the necessity of DNR orders may be less
common in regions where there have been fewer
AIDS patients.)
It is heartening to see Callahan take account of
some particulars about dying, but he does not go far
enough. I agree that the difficult problems surrounding health care at the end of life ought never to have
been constructed as a dilemma with involuntary euthanasia at the bottom of one slippery slope and
force-feeding of dying patients at the bottom of another. But why should we blame "technology" for this
construction? There is a criticism to be made of our
common expectations of technology. Stephen Lammers has made the point that our society regularly
looks to technology to solve perennial human problems. Such problems as suffering and death are ones
that we cannot solve, however; we can only cope with
them. The difficulty is not with technology but with
our unrealistic expectations of it.
The construction of a forced choice between involuntary euthanasia and force-feeding of the dying (or
those in a persistent vegetative state) arises from inattention to the actual situation. As one moves closer to
the situation the illusion of a slippery slope disappears and some levels of terracing become clear.
However, neither the principles nor the distinctions
that Callahan offers take us very far.

C

allahan's first principle—that "no one should
have to die a worse death as a result of medical
technology than would have been the case prior to
the invention of that technology"—helps only with
the few cases in which one is certain how and when
the patient will die if treated. Most cases are like the
one I encountered some years ago at one of the medical schools at which I taught. A Roman Catholic
priest, who was showing signs of rejecting a transplanted kidney, clearly expressed the desire, if and
when the transplant failed, to die in the company of
his friends, also religious, who visited him regularly.
He expressed great concern that he not die alone and
that his death not be dominated by medical interventions.
The person who brought the example to my attention was a young nurse, a Roman Catholic herself,
who understood the priest's expression as not merely
a preference but a spiritual concern in keeping with
his whole set of religious convictions. She was gratified that the priest's physician was fully supportive.
One Monday the nurse returned after a weekend
off to find that the priest had gone into crisis. The
priest's regular physician was away and the physician in charge had begun a vigorous effort to "save
the life" of the priest. It was not certain when the intervention began that the conclusion would be death.
However, that was the result. The priest died, isolated
from his spiritual support and surrounded by a
flurry of medical activity. The nurse was appalled at
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this betrayal of the priest's trust. She was confident
that the priest's own physician would have permitted
comfort measures only.
This was a worse death, but it was not fully predictable when the intervention began. Furthermore,
it is not by some applicable-to-all "quality of death"
measure that this death is judged worse. Identical interventions might have been quite appropriate with
another patient in the same medical circumstances
but for whom surviving to see the birth of a grandchild held special meaning. What was wrong with
the care of the priest can be understood only in relation to the practices by which the sacred was recognized and celebrated in this person's life.
The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary fails for many of the same reasons as Callahan's
first principle, although I certainly agree that it is
wrongheaded to seek to force on patients "any nonburdensome treatment that will sustain life, whatever the condition of that life."
The word "ordinary" can be heard in many different ways, such as: what is routine (at this facility);
what is covered by health insurance; what is an established, as contrasted with an experimental, treatment. The language of ordinary/extraordinary is
dangerous since it is likely to be misunderstood. In
one widely known case a couple who witnessed a
series of harrowing interventions on their newborn
child after they had specified "no heroic measures"
said, "It all looked heroic to us." The staff had interpreted their words to allow all procedures that were
routine in the newborn intensive care facility.
The criteria of "burden" and "benefit" that Callahan specifies for application of the ordinary/extraordinary distinction are vague. As with the criteria for
his first principle, these fail to take into account the
uncertainty that prevails about the results of medical
interventions, and do not consider such specifics as
the place of practices in which the person experiences
or participates in the sacred. Surely these ought to be
a part of any consideration of the sanctity of life.
Even the established distinction between omission
and commission may cause confusion, especially if
not tempered with the principle of double effect.
Many of the medications for severe pain also depress
respiration and so hasten death. Families often face a
double bind—either risk killing their loved one, or
risk letting the person suffer unnecessarily. They
escape that double bind by refusing to have their
family members die at home—which may have worse
results yet.

C

allahan's second principle addresses health care
providers, or at least physicians. Let us interpret
it as a specification of the physician's responsibilities
rather than, literally, as a stipulation of what physicians should feel. Locating moral responsibility with
people is better than scapegoating "technology."
However, the question of a person's participation in
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meaningful practices is a matter about which physicians may not be knowledgeable. For example, suppose that a given patient now either dying or in a
PVS had experienced the risk of starvation for some
period in life. Contrast this patient with another
with the same medical profile but who had fasting (as
an aid to spiritual centering) as a part of his or her
spiritual practice. Supposing the patient to have any
awareness of the care being given, might not the cessation of feeding be different in the two cases because
of the difference in the meaning of hunger for the
two? For the first patient one might continue giving
food after antibiotics had been stopped, but do the reverse for the second.
My arguments and examples are meant to illustrate how the role of what Alasdair Maclntyre and
Stanley Hauerwas call "internal goods" need to be
considered in forming policies about medical care.
As they argue, ethics has gone astray by focusing exclusively on "external goods," that is, on the goods
that are the external ends or goals of some activity or
practice. (For example, producing crops is the external goal of farming.) The goods that are continually
neglected are those that are internal to the practice,
that is, those that are achieved in the practice. Hauerwas gives as examples of practices with significant
internal goods, baseball and the worship of God.
A good death is to be understood not only in terms
of the relative absence of pain and disability but also
in terms of whether we keep faith with each other and
ensure that the dying are neither betrayed, abandoned, nor invaded in the care they receive, in particular, that recognition and support is given those spiritual concerns that have been central to their lives.
CAROLINE WHITBECK is a philosopher

of science,

technology, and medicine at Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. Her book Understanding Moral
Problems will be published next year by Cambridge
University Press.

William E. May
TXaniel Callahan is quite correct, I believe, in
U saying that one of the principal reasons for the
growing acceptance of euthanasia in our society is
the legitimate fear many have of a "technologically
induced bad death for themselves and their family
members." It is crucially important to respect the
right of competent patients, and of persons charged
with the care of those whom the late Paul Ramsey
termed "voiceless" patients, to refuse burdensome
and useless treatments. This was the precise issue examined so thoroughly and competently by Germain
Grisez and Joseph Boyle in their very important, but
unfortunately little noticed, study, Life and Death
with Liberty and Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate, published in 1979.
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Callahan is also quite correct in recognizing the
crucial moral difference between killing and allowing a person to die his or her own death, inasmuch as
it can be morally right to withhold or withdraw lifeprolonging measures when their employment is
unduly burdensome and/or useless. Yet Callahan, I
fear, too easily equates "allowing a person to die"
with acts of omission. Some acts of omission are
lethal, because they are adopted precisely as a means
to bring about someone's death. As the Declaration
on Euthanasia prepared by the Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith in 1980 correcdy observed, "By
euthanasia is understood an action or an omission
which of itself or by intention causes death, in order
that all suffering may in this way be eliminated."
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his brings us to the central issue of Callahan's
essay, the proper care of persons in the so-called
"persistent vegetative state." Callahan's basic argument, so it seems to me, is that we ought not provide
these persons with food and hydration by tubal
means because their lives are of no value to them. He
has passed, so it seems to me, from judging whether a
treatment is burdensome and/or useless to a person to
judging that some individuals' lives are burdensome
and/or useless to them. He describes their lives as
"zombie-like," and says that the condition is "actually
worse than that of a newly fertilized egg" (I'll return
to the question of the "fertilized egg" below). The implicit judgment is that persons in the so-called PVS
condition are better off dead than alive and that,
therefore, it is of no use or value to them to be given
the food and water necessary to sustain their burdensome and useless lives. But if it is indeed true that the
lives of PVS persons are of no value to them and it is
morally legitimate to withhold or withdraw food
and hydration from them in order to relieve them of
the burdensomeness of their useless lives, then surely
it would be morally legitimate to hasten their deaths,
which would undoubtedly be prolonged were they
not to be fed or hydrated, by some active means.
Callahan also presupposes that PVS persons are in
the process of dying. At one time I shared this presupposition, but I have since learned that this is not the
case. In fact, the American Academy of Neurology
has explicitly recognized that such persons are not in
danger of imminent death because of their condition,
a matter well brought out by the Catholic Bishops of
Pennsylvania in their carefully constructed statement, "Nutrition and Hydration: Moral Considerations."
With regard to Callahan's comparison of the lives
of PVS patients with the lives of "fertilized eggs," I
would simply note that once an egg has been fertilized it is no longer an egg but a new living being, and
in the case of the human species, a new human
being—surely a being of incomparably greater value
than an tíegg."
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allahan poses two questions for those who,
like me, believe there is value in preserving
the life of someone in a PVS state. The first is whether
they would have wanted medical research to invent
respirators and artificial feeding for the sole purpose
of keeping PVS patients alive. To this I answer first
that I do not think it morally obligatory to keep
PVS patients alive by the means of respirators, for
their use would, I believe, be unduly burdensome.
I likewise do not think that I would have wanted
medical research to invent artificial feeding for
the sole purpose of keeping PVS patients alive,
because it is quite evident that tubal means of providing food and nourishment are valuable for persons
suffering from various sorts of disorders, and that
they are also of value for PVS patients. Callahan
also asks whether the belief that it is good for a
person in the PVS state to be kept alive does not
also imply that "further research should be carried
out to make that even more possible, to keep those in
that state alive longer and longer, even a full lifetime." To this I answer that the issue of "further research" raises a whole host of questions regarding allocation of our resources. It would be preferable, in
my judgment, to allocate resources to the alleviation
and prevention of many other disorders, to the prevention of persons from becoming injured to such an
extent that they are in the PVS state, and to investigate avenues of helping improve the condition of
PVS patients.
In conclusion, I believe that Eugene F. Diamond's
comments in the Linacre Quarterly (February 1992),
reflecting on the Pennsylvania Bishops' Statement,
are pertinent. Dr. Diamond observed: "The focus of
the debate [over providing PVS patients with food
and hydration] should be kept where it belongs. It is
not about the terminally ill patient who is imminently dying and who will die anyway whether or not
food and drink are continued by whatever means.
The issue relates to the patient who is not dying but
rather is being provided food and drink by so-called
'artificial' means because of inability to feed himself.
. . . For such a patient, tube feeding is useful, in that it
sustains his life, and is not excessively burdensome because it can be provided at low cost and by unskilled
personnel."
WILLIAM E. MAY is Michael J. McGivney Professor of
Moral Theology at the John Paul II Institute for Studies of Marriage and Family. Ignatius Press recently
published his translation of the second Italian edition
of Ramon Garcia de Haro's Marriage and Family in
the Documents of the Magisterium.

Eric Cassell
hysicians are a pragmatic group devoted to
action. In caring for the kinds of patients Daniel
Callahan discusses they rarely say to themselves,
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"I'm going to save Smith's life," or, "I'm not going to
let Jones die," even when they are doing just those
things. Instead, the situation in front of them—Smith
sick as spit or Jones dying—is converted by their
thinking into a specific medical (technical) problem.
Smith had a heart attack and is going into shock.
Heart attacks present distinct problems calling for
defined actions. Transfer to the Cardiac Care Unit.
Start this or that medication. Attend to the monitors,
alert to certain events that threaten. Possibly going
into shock? Place a Swann-Ganz catheter to monitor
pulmonary wedge pressure. Put in an A line to monitor the blood pressure. Consider aortic balloon
counter pulsation. And so on. Each act in the here
and now, concerned only with the present. Each act is
an instrumental goal in itself that supports the
saving of Smith's life. The larger goal is pushed
aside, however, by technology and the medical science on which it is based, and multiple subsidiary
goals are substituted. At the bedside, doctors are uncomfortable about philosophical issues because they
get in the way of action.
The same is true of keeping Jones from dying even
if Jones is a demented old lady who hasn't looked or
acted like a responsive human being in months.
There she lies, mouth .open, eyes shut, contracted
limbs and bedsores for all to see. Her blood culture
showed bacteria so the doctor treats that infection.
She is dehydrated so she gets fluids intravenously. She
cannot eat. A feeding tube is inserted. Back in medical school, her doctor took a course in ethics and patients like Jones were discussed. Should they be kept
alive? Is food or fluid like any other treatment? The
doctor believed that it was inhumane to keep such
people alive. Yet here he is, doing just what he didn't
believe in. Afraid of the Chief of Medicine, the hospital counsel, and what the other house staff might say.
For keeping Jones alive there are established procedures and guidelines for treatment. For allowing the
patient to die no such guidelines yet exist. Hannah
Arendt's banality of evil is forced to mind, but now
banality just as thoughtlessly in the service of benevolence.
Why? Because all the technical issues involved in
the cases—from the anatomical definition of coronary artery disease to the readout on the monitor for
blood pressure—are abstractions from the lives of
these patients. These serve wonderfully well as guides
for the actions of physicians when patients can represent themselves. How about in the care of Jones, who
hasn't been self-determining for ages? Here, medical
abstractions are inadequate representations of the
person who is Mrs. Jones.
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hat is meant by Smith's or Jones' life in this
context? In fact, who is Smith in the CCU? Or
Jones lying in her bed? Their doctors hardly know
anything about them, not because they cannot, but
because they are not trained to find out. Both pa-
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tients are in the throes of illness, something from
which no life is ever free. Over the centuries, but particularly in the last two hundred years, two reductive
steps have moved medicine away from the complex
social, psychological, and personal dimensions of illness. The first step was to substitute the modern idea
of "disease" for the illness. The second step was the
introduction of medical science and its purely biological view of disease. And the consequent technologies (X-ray, laboratory test, EKGs, etc.) that allow
medicine to consider diseases at a distance from the
patient.
These two strategies have led to the phenomenal
advances of biomedicine and the conquest (nothing
less) of many diseases. Alas, they have also fooled
everyone (including doctors) into the wrongheaded
notion that the fundamental personal problems of
life and death—bonding, growing, developing, becoming, being, declining, leaving, and grieving—are
also open to technological fixes. Of which euthanasia and legalized assisted suicide are just two examples. It is not medicine or science that is the enemy,
but the continued abstraction from the real life of
real humans of which they are both the parents and
the children.
I believe that Daniel Callahan is incorrect in suggesting that physicians have coopted the principle of
the sanctity of life. They share it with the rest of their
culture. It is not only medicine that urges the continued treatment of patients like Jones or those in a persistent vegetative state. Nor doctors alone who do not
want to remove feeding tubes and the like. I think he
is also wrong in believing that the courts are longstanding champions of allowing the hopelessly ill a
way out. There may even have been commentators in
these pages who strongly argued—in the name of
life's sanctity—the error of allowing someone to die
by removing nutrition and hydration. What is the life
that is sacred, the body's life, the person's life, Jones'
life? In most discussions it is not life in the sense that
you and I know or live it, but some abstraction as
remote from Smith and Jones as the doctors' technological abstractions.
At the end of the nineteenth century it appeared as
though Western culture was beginning to come to
terms with human life as persons actually live it. In
this century, however, the project has faltered. Instead, it has been reductionist and oversimplifying in
its sciences (including social science), graphic arts,
music, and philosophy. Little wonder that ethics as
much as medicine is cursed by abstractions that separate them from the richness of human existence.
Things are changing, though, and again the complexity of the real is forcing itself into cultural consciousness (evident not only in recent trends in medicine and ethics—witness Callahan—but the arts and
philosophy as well). In examining the issues raised
by Callahan, we must return to the hard reality of the
cases and the phenomena involved. It is this sick
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person we should concern ourselves with, not some
ghostly abstraction.
ERIC CASSELL, M.D., is a practicing internist in New

York City and an attending physician at the New York
Hospital. He is Clinical Professor of Public Health at
Cornell University Medical College. His booL· include The Healer's Art, The Place of the Humanités
in Medicine, Changing Values in Medicine, and,
most recently, The Nature of Suffering.

Daniel Callahan replies
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y commentators have raised important issues
and advanced some potent objections. I appreciate that. Yet I was immediately struck by how little
was actually said about the main issue on my mind,
that of the power of technology to distort our thinking about matters of life and death. Eric Cassell, who
has written in a penetrating way elsewhere on technology, only alludes to it here, while Caroline Whitbeck and M. Thérèse Lysaught are the only ones who
really mention it directly at all. But Whitbeck thinks
the only problem is with our "unrealistic expectations" of technology, while Lysaught believes the real
problem is "the ideology behind technology."
I am reminded here of a common slogan of those
who oppose any serious limits on the availability of
hand guns: "It is not guns that kill, but people," as if
the widespread availability of guns themselves had
nothing to do with the high rate of death by guns. As
happens in medicine as well, that kind of attitude underestimates the independent (if sometimes uncanny)
power of technology to shape us, those who think we
only shape it. The availability of medical technologies changes the way we think about their use and the
way we think about the life and death that they can
influence.
I would note in this respect two points of historical
significance, one bearing on medical progress, the
other on the way technological advances reshape our
thinking. My first point is that just about all of the
major debates of late on the care of the dying have
been occasioned by the advent, and then routinized
use of, a relatively new technology. It was not until
the 1960s that there was any significant argument
about turning off respirators or extending the life of
low birthweight babies in neonatal ICU units
(NICUS). Neither respirators nor NICUS were much
used before that time. It was not until the early 1980s
that the debate over artificial nutrition and hydration
emerged, mainly because it was only in the 1970s that
such a form of treatment came into widespread and
routine use because of technological improvements.
I conclude that the great, and still unappreciated,
problem is what to think and do about technological
innovation—and particularly that form of innovation
that does not cure but is able to keep a severely ill or

damaged person alive but in terrible shape. We will
see more and more of such nasty "progress" in the
future. A difference between my critics and me is that
they seem to assume that if a new technology comes
along that can sustain life, the benefit of any doubt
must be toward the use of that technology. In no case,
moreover, ought we be allowed to take into account
the kind of life, or the burden of life, that the new technology may create or allow to be sustained. By contrast, I am trying to work with the notion that we
should be free not to use a new technology—to give it
no benefit of the doubt at all—and in any case not use
it if it promises us a worse burden of both treatment
and life than was the case before it appeared.

G

ilbert Meilaender, William E. May, and William
B. Smith seem to think that since we can now
technologically keep PVS patients going by technology, therefore we must do so, that some traditional
moral principles compel us. If they are correct, then
we should either reconsider those principles to make
them more technology-resistant, or ask whether they
really exact such obeisance to technological possibility. In any case, I want to find a better way to distance
ourselves from the technological imperative; they
seem to me in danger of being captured by it.
My second historical point turns on the way technological change leads us to redefine some basic concepts. May and Smith think that a person in a PVS
state is "disabled," not "dying." Recollect, however,
that when Karen Ann Quinlan's respirator was
turned off in the mid-1970s there was every expectation she would die, and great surprise when she did
not. Such patients were not then thought "physically
robust" at all, to use Meilaender's phrase. Until that
point in medical history, a person in a PVS state ordinarily died in a relatively short time: hence, to be a
person in a PVS state was to be a dying person.
My surmise is that it was precisely the improved
methods of artificial nutrition and hydration, plus
other medical advances, that made it possible by the
mid-1970s to keep Karen Ann Quinlan alive so long
(ten years). Biological inevitability could be forestalled by medical ingenuity. Yet for just this historical reason, it is perfecdy reasonable to refer still to
people in PVS as biologically dying, not simply disabled. The fact that we can arrest, or suspend, the underlying fatal condition for a time, even a long time,
does not change the underlying biological reality: a
PVS patient has been captured by a fatal condition
which, if we do not artificially stop it, will kill the patient. It is only technological prowess (and maybe
some hubris) that has led us to redefine "dying":
nature will not presume to tell us who is dying; we
will leave that to our technology.
he importance of this mistake—letting technology redefine biological reality—is pertinent also
for another problem in the responses to my article,
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that bearing on "uncertainty." Whitbeck, I think,
falls perfectly into a familiar technological trap,
arguing that because a worse death might not be predictable, a doctor is justified in going ahead with
treatment. The difficulty here is that contemporary
medical technologies are usually powerful enough
to bring uncertainty to almost any medical decision.
We might be able to say, in a general way, that a
patient is dying, but it gets harder and harder to say
that a given technological intervention will not buy
us a little more time. It probably will, which is why
it is common to observe that most patients now die as
the result of a conscious decision to stop or not to
start treatment; it can hardly be otherwise given the
power of technology to extend almost any life to
some extent. The result too often here is that uncertainty is dealt with by a technological bias: don't stop
aggressive treatment until there is some definitive evidence it will do no further good. Technological
progress renders such evidence increasingly elusive.
Now it is exactly that problem that sets us up for
the suspicion that Meilaender has about the current
practice of omission of treatment. "We may already,"
he writes, "be deliberately letting die people who
aren't really dying." That may indeed be the case
(even though I know of no direct evidence to support
such a trend), but there may be a harder judgment to
be made here than he allows. If we come to define as
"not dying" a person whose process of dying technology can suspend for a time (redefining him as just
disabled), then of course every time a physician
allows a patient who might be given a few more
hours or days to die, he will be open to the charge
that he is just part of the "transitional stage" to euthanasia. That would not seem to me a fair or reasonable judgment.
Nor do I think it fair or reasonable to interpret
what doctors customarily do when they terminate
treatment of a patient whom their technology might
continue to sustain as displaying an "intent . . . to
bring about death" (which is, incidentally, what
many euthanasia supporters also say). If a doctor
wants a patient to die and terminates treatment with
that as the specific purpose of the termination, that is
wrong. But if, instead, a physician believes that the
patient as a person no longer benefits from his efforts
to suspend or arrest the dying process—either because of the burden of treatment or the burden of
life—and then stands aside to allow death to take its
inevitable course, no wrong has been committed.
The intention is not to bring about death, but to
allow the death that nature has built into our lives to
take place. This is very different from saying that
some "lives aren't worth preserving" (Meilaender) or
that "their lives are of no benefit to them" (May). I do
not hear doctors saying that, nor should they.

I

n this respect, however, it strikes me as neither
clear nor helpful to draw a sharp distinction be-
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tween a burden of treatment and a burden of life. A
painless, superficially non-burdensome, treatment
that allows a painful or unwanted medical condition
to continue should be as much feared as a painful
treatment; who knows, or could ever know, whether
Meilaender's demented seventy-seven-year-old pulls
at his feeding tube because the tube causes him discomfort or because the kind of life the tube is sustaining is not one he wants to live? Would Meilaender tie
down his hands (a not uncommon practice) if he suspected the latter alone was the man's motive? I doubt
it. But I say it does not matter anyway: whatever his
reasons, the patient does not want the tube, and that
should be respected.
Medicine becomes increasingly clever in devising
non-burdensome technologies to prolong miserable
lives that a kinder nature would have allowed to end
more peaceably in an earlier era. That is exactly the
kind of medical "progress" we should question, just
as we should have questioned in the 1970s whether we
really wanted to go down the road of improved ways
of extending the life expectancy of those in a PVS
state.
Smith is worried that "the list of patients deserving
human care is shorter today." Maybe he lives around
a different group of doctors and families and ethicists
from those I do, but I know of no one who says that
people should not have "human care," if by that is
meant comfort, palliation, and non-abandonment.
The only "shorter list" I see operating is one bearing
on the use of medical technology, and a good thing
that is.
As far as I can guess, just about everything that
would be on Smith's longer list would be some technology that came into widespread use only within
the past two to three decades. Those decades were a
period of enormous technological development and
aggressive, usually compulsive, application. Thus at
first it was thought imperative always to keep respirators going, then to keep all technologies going at
top speed in NICUS, and then to keep artificial nutrition and hydration going. The technological imperative was in the saddle, and to doubt its value was
to be judged guilty of lacking both the secular virtue
of loving progress and the religious value of the sanctity of life. That's what created Smith's longer list—
but it was the creature of a particular, and limited,
historical era. The error is to take the practices of
that era as some timeless norm of respect for human
life. It was more likely a bemusement with technology that was calling the moral shots.

W

e seem to have come out of that compulsive era,
gradually returning to standards of an earlier
time, when it was not always thought a terrible thing
that nature brought life to an end, especially when it
spared a person further suffering or a humanly
empty prolongation of life. I can recall many religious people in that pretechnological era speaking
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of some deaths as a "blessing," even thanking God for
bringing the suffering to an end. Was that wrong on
their part? Should they instead now be thankful that
the PVS loved one can be kept alive for years, and be
full of pity for those earlier generations who were un
aware of the benefits that medical technology could
bring them? I'll take the shorter list myself, and I
think the tradition would support my doing so.
To accept the shorter list does not, however, entail
an embrace of euthanasia or physician-assisted sui
cide. There is a great gap between omitting treat
ment and direcdy killing. When we omit a treatment,
we are doing what medicine has always done, and has
always had to do. We do not by such actions change
the historical institution of medicine. There is, to be
sure, always the danger that we may omit treatment
too early, or deliberately and wrongly aim to end a life
by doing so. But that hazard has always been present,
and the tradition has lavished great attention on
where and how to draw the appropriate lines and
proceed with the right intentions. Euthanasia utterly
changes all that: it is we, not nature, who kill; and

medicine becomes an institution that legitimates the
taking as well as the saving of life.
A word on the "potential for development" notion,
which so concerns Smith. I take it that we distinguish
human beings from other species because of a char
acteristic range of capacities and potentialities that
only humans possess. These include self-conscious
ness and the capacity for a wide range of emotions,
reasoning skills, and interpersonal relationships. I
simply fail to see what benefit any form of treatment
can have for a person who has lost those capacities.
The quadriplegic has those capacities and so do most
of the severely demented, even if the latters' capaci
ties are much diminished (and despite Meilaender's
guess, I favor more treatment of the demented than
he has guessed). The PVS patient is utterly different.
By virtue of the loss of the cerebral cortex, the human
capacities of PVS victims are permanently lost. It is
hardly surprising that, before we invented effective
tubes to nourish such beings, nature let them die
quickly. It knew what it was doing. Θ

April
One day without warning Spring arrives,
As predictable and unexpected as a death.
Birdsong and the smack of dripping water, car tires
Spitting on wet pavement sound strange and loud
In the soft air.
I am as empty as the trees and snowless land,
Stripped of winter's enfolding wrap.
Now robins tug at swollen worms,
Raw green shoots split the earth.
Nature has her way.
In December the ground was frozen
Hard as a bone. It took a backhoe to dig the hole.
As long as I left traces in the snow
You still were here.
What's dead is dead and I can live with that;
This rebirth's an intolerable affront.
Suzanne Jane
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